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Abstract  
 
The intention here is to contribute towards metatheoretical development as part of the 
post-Postmodern ‘return to’ sociological theory and method associated with Sibeon 
[2004, 2007], Layder [2004, 2007], Mouzelis [1991, 1993, 1995, 2007], Archer [1995, 
1998] and Owen [2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2009, 2012], in tandem with an attempt to 
build bridges between the social and biological sciences in the form of an ontologically-
flexible, Genetic-Social framework with which to study issues pertaining to genetics and 
identity. This involves marrying aspects of anti-reductionist sociological theory with 
selected insights from evolutionary psychology and behavioural genetics in a similar 
fashion to Owen’s [2012] recent attempt to do so in relation to crime and criminal 
behaviour. Selected meta-constructs from the framework are applied to selected examples 
from the literature on genetics and identity in order to demonstrate the explanatory 
potential. The term, Genetic-Social is favoured here in order to distance the conceptual 
toolkit’s approach from that of hardline Sociobiology. 
 
 
Introduction 
The framework outlined here arises out of a critique of the following illegitimate forms of 
theoretical reasoning, and is intended as a way that sociological theory might move beyond 
what appear to be major obstacles towards a new sociology of genetics and identity. These 
obstacles are, the nihilistic relativism of the Postmodern/Post-Structuralist cultural turn; the 
oversocialised gaze and harshly environmentalist conceptions of the person; genetic fatalism 
or the equation of genetic predisposition with inevitability [Owen, 2009, 2012] and bio-
phobia [Freese et al, 2003] that appear to dominate mainstream social science. The starting 
point is to modify Sibeon’s original anti-reductionist framework to include a new focus upon 
the biological variable [the evidence for a partial genetic basis for human behaviour in 
relation to sexuality, language, reactions to stress etcetera], genetic fatalism, the 
oversocialised gaze and asocial psychobiography. 
 
1.  Reductionism.  This term is included in Sibeon’s (1999, 2004) original anti-reductionist 
framework.  Reductionist theories are ones which attempt to reduce ‘the complexities of 
social life to a single, unifying principle of explanation or analytical prime mover (Hindess, 
1986a, 1988) such as ‘the interests of capitalism’, ‘patriarchy’, ‘rational choice’, ‘the risk 
society’, ‘trust’, ‘the information society’, ‘globalisation’, or whatever’ (Sibeon, 2004: 2). 
 
2.  Essentialism.  This term is included in Sibeon’s original framework.  Essentialism is, ‘a 
form of theorising that in aprioristic fashion presupposes a unity or homogeneity of social 
phenomena’ (Sibeon, ibid: 4). This can include social institutions, or taxonomic collectivities 
such as ‘white men’. 
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3.  Reification.  This term too is included in Sibeon’s original framework.  Reification is the 
‘illicit attribution of agency to entities that are not actors or agents’ (ibid).  In Sibeon’s (ibid) 
view, and echoed in the ‘new’, modified framework, an actor is an entity that, ‘in principle 
has the means of formulating, taking and acting upon decisions’.  Sibeon’s original, non-
reified definition draws upon Harre’s (1981) concept of agency and Hindess’s (1988: 45) 
‘minimal concept of actor’, which specify that for an entity to be regarded as an actor, it must 
be capable of formulating and acting upon decisions.  As Sibeon (ibid) suggests, on the basis 
of such a non-reified definition, there are two types of actors, namely individual human actors 
and Hindess’s concept of ‘social actors’ (1986: 115).  ‘Social actors’ include organisations 
such as government departments like the Home Office, organised pressure groups, and 
committees such as the Cabinet and micro groups such as individual households (Sibeon, ibid: 
5).  These ‘social actors’ have been termed ‘supra-individuals’ by Harre (1981: 141). 
 
4.  Functional Teleology.  Again, this term forms part of Sibeon’s original framework.  It may 
be defined as, ‘an invalid form of analysis involving attempts to explain the causes of social 
phenomena in terms of their effects, where ‘effects’ refers to outcomes or consequences 
viewed as performances of ‘functions’ (Sibeon, ibid: 6).  Sibeon’s definition draws upon the 
work of Betts (1986: 51), and the argument is that, if there is no evidence of intentional 
planning by actors ‘somewhere, sometime’ (Sibeon, ibid), then it is a teleological fallacy to 
engage in explication of the causes of phenomena in terms of their effects.   
5.  The Oversocialised Gaze.  This term forms part of the ‘new’ modified framework 
alongside the previous four illicit forms of theoretical reasoning.  The ‘new’ term refers to 
harshly ‘environmentalist’ accounts which are characterised by a strong antipathy towards 
genetic, or partially genetic explanations.  The term has been applied to the work of Gagnon 
and Simon (1973) by Owen (2006a, 2006b,2007a, 2009, 2012), in order to criticise the 
symbolic interactionists’ theory that there is no ‘natural’, sexual drive in human biological 
make-up’. Contrary evidence can be found in the work of Hamer and Copeland (1999: 163), 
who have clearly shown how genes influence our sexual desire, how often we have sexual 
congress and ‘help make us receptive to the social interactions and signs of mutual attraction 
that we feel instinctively and now call love’. 
 
6.  Genetic Fatalism.  This is another ‘new’ term, now incorporated within the framework 
employed here.  As Owen (2006a, 2006b,2009) shows, the term refers to a widespread 
tendency within social science to equate genetic predisposition with inevitability. It is a 
mistake to view the genes involved in human behaviour as immutable.  As Ridley (1999: 153) 
cogently suggests, ‘genes need to be switched on, and external events – or free-willed 
behaviour – can switch on genes’. 
 
In addition to these ‘cardinal sins’, the framework focuses upon the metatheoretical 
formulations of agency-structure, time-space and micro-macro, in addition to notions of 
Foucauldian power, the ‘new’ term, the biological variable, and favours a dualism rather than 
a duality of structure. A metatheory is, as Sibeon (2004: 13] suggests, intended to inform and 
‘hopefully improve the construction of substantive theories and the design of empirical 
studies’. 
 
7.  Agency-structure.  These are important meta-concepts which refer to significant aspects of 
social reality.  In Sibeon’s original framework, and as applied here in the ‘new’ modified 
framework, the conception of agency is a non-reified one, in which actors or agents are 
defined as entities that are, in principle, capable of formulating and acting upon decisions.  
Structure refers to the ‘social conditions’ (Hindess, 1986: 120-1), or the circumstances in 
which actors operate, including ‘the resources that actors may draw upon’ (Sibeon, ibid: 54).  
Structure then, may refer to discourses, institutions, social practices and individual/social 
actors. 
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8.  Micro-macro.  Another meta-concept which ‘refers to differences in the units of and scale 
of analyses concerned with the investigation of varying extensions of time-space’ (Sibeon, 
ibid).  Micro and macro should be viewed as distinct and autonomous levels of social process.  
Apparently, Sibeon was influenced by Layder’s (1994, 1997) argument to the ends that events 
in social life, at one level, do not determine events at anther level, although ‘there may be 
contingently produced and contingently sustained empirical connections between levels.’  
(Sibeon, ibid: 55). 
 
9.  Time-space.  This meta-concept refers to, ‘significant but neglected dimensions of the 
social’ (Sibeon, ibid: 166).  As Sibeon has made clear, the term reflects concerns with 
temporality and spatiality.  Classical social theorists (Durkheim, for example) have tended to 
regard time, as ‘social time’, distinct from ‘a natural essence’ (Sibeon, ibid).  However, ‘the 
question of how differing time-frames – including those associated with the macro-social 
order and those with the micro-social – interweave is a complex matter’ that relates to debates 
pertaining to dualism versus duality (Sibeon, ibid]. 
 
10.  Power.  Like Layder (2004), Sibeon acknowledges the multiple nature of power.  For 
Sibeon (ibid: 145), his (meta) theoretical precepts lead to a view that, ‘power exists in more 
than one form; in particular, there are objective structural (including systemic) forms of 
power, and agentic power’, a term used to refer to ‘the partly systemic and partly relational 
and potentially variable capacity of agents to shape events in a preferred direction’. This 
modified notion of Foucauldian power [Sibeon, 2004; Owen, 2009, 2012] recognises the 
‘dialectical relationship between agentic and systemic forms of power, and the concept that, 
contra Foucault, aspects of power can be ‘stored’ in positions/roles and as social 
systems/networks’ [Owen, 2012: 93]. 
 
11.  Dualism.  Sibeon’s original framework favours dualism rather than notions of duality of 
structure.  In doing so, he is also in the company of Layder (1994, 1997, 2004).  As Sibeon 
has suggested (1997a: 72), like Giddensian structuration theory, Foucault’s work has a 
tendency to ‘compact agency and structure together instead of treating them as a dualism’.  
Owen (2006a:186) has employed dualism in favour of duality, and makes the point that, ‘This 
Foucauldian tendency (1972, 1980a, 1982) to compact agency and structure together, to 
collapse distinctions between the two, results in what Archer (1995) calls ‘central conflation’.  
 
12.  The Biological Variable.  This ‘new’ term reflects Owen’s (2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 
2009,2012) respectful criticism of Sibeon’s original anti-reductionism along the lines that it 
neglects biological or partly biological causality in explanations of social ‘reality’.  We should 
regard the biological variable as the evidence from evolutionary psychology and behavioural 
genetics for a, at least in part, biological basis for some human behaviour.  We should keep 
Ridley’s (1999, 2003) notion of ‘nature via nurture’ firmly in mind when focusing upon 
biological variables in analysis.  This refers to the ‘feedback loop’ which embraces both 
genes and environment, acknowledging plasticity and mutuality. Genes predetermine the 
broad structure of the brain of Homo Sapiens, but they also absorb formative experiences and 
react to social cues.  In short, nurture depends upon genes, and genes require nurture.  In the 
work of Owen [2009] the evidence for a biological basis for certain human behaviour is 
examined, and  in particular, the evidence that language is innate and specific to our species 
was considered with reference to the work of Hamer and Copeland (1999), Ridley (2003), 
Dunbar (1996) and others and the work of Hamer and Copeland (ibid), and Bogaert and 
Fisher (1995) in which evidence that sexual drive is genetically-determined as opposed to 
being a cultural and historical construction (Gagnon and Simon, 1973; Foucault, 1980b) was 
also examined.  Combined with additional evidence from the work of those such as Harris 
(1998) which challenges nurture determinism with hard evidence from studies in the field of 
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behavioural genetics upon personality traits, the decision was made to include the biological 
variable – evidence for genetic or partly genetic causality as a concept in the ‘new’ modified 
metatheoretical framework. 
 
13. Psychobiography. This refers to Layder’s [1997] concept of the, ‘largely unique, asocial 
components of an actor’s disposition, behaviour and self-identity’ [Owen, 2012: 90]. Here a 
modified notion of psychobiography is adopted, which embraces the mutuality and plasticity 
of the relations between genetic and environmental influences. 
 
Demonstrating the Framework’s Explanatory Potential 
 
Now, the task is to demonstrate the framework’s explanatory potential by identifying  selected 
examples of the illegitimate forms of reasoning listed previously within the literature and 
approaches to studying issues pertaining to genetics and identity within contemporary social 
science and to selected examples of related bio-social issues such as the ‘bridge building’ 
between social and biological sciences.  This will also involve an application of some of the 
metatheoretical concepts to the literature and approaches. The argument put forward in this 
paper, supported by the work of Owen (2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2009, 2012) and Powell 
and Owen (2005) is that another ‘opening’ may lie in a ‘bridge building’ exercise in which we 
acknowledge the mutuality and plasticity of genes and environment.  This, of course, involves 
acknowledging the biological variable, or the evidence from evolutionary 
psychology/behavioural genetics for biological causality.  Yet, predisposition, as Ridley 
(1999, 2003) cogently suggests, need not be viewed through the lens of genetic fatalism – 
genes respond to social cues and are not immutable.    
 
Reification 
Reification, the ‘cardinal sin’ of illegitimately attributing agency to entities which are not 
actors can be found within the literature of social science pertaining to the study of  identity 
and  genetics. The work of Owen (2006b:911) has suggested that the Human Genome Project 
is an entity that is not an actor, and that to argue otherwise would be to engage in reification.   
 
Owen (ibid) suggests, we need to keep firmly in mind Hindess’s (1986: 115) 
formulation of social actors (a crucial component of the framework’s methodology inherited 
from Sibeon’s original anti-reductionism), in which Hindess defines an actor as a ‘locus of 
decision and action where the action is in some sense a consequence of the actor’s decisions’.  
There are those, however, such as Wilkie (1994: 187) who, in a discussion of the Genome 
Project and its implications and the impact of new genetic knowledge upon individuals/social 
institutions  engages in reification when he claims that institutions ‘have a history and their 
own inertia and ‘will to live’’.  Additionally, the author reifies ‘society’ too, when he claims 
that, ‘society needs to demarcate those things which will be permitted and to list those which, 
for the moment, ought to be forbidden’ (Wilkie, ibid: 188). 
Cazillis (2001) has identified the problem of embryo reification in the use of stem 
cells.  The author claims that we are facing ethical problems related to the moral status of the 
embryo, genetic engineering and ownership rights on living organisms raised by modern 
human biotechnology and its use.  As stem cells are, ‘the most recent consequence of the 
over-accelerating biological process, it is not surprising that they are triggering most of the 
heated debates in the life sciences section’ (Cazillis, ibid: 1).  Such debates have to steer a 
path through two main dangers, according to the author in a EUROPA, European 
Commission Research Centre article.  On one hand, there is the possibility of taking hasty 
decisions (under pressure from international competition), and on the other hand, there lies 
the possibility of missing the opportunity ‘for therapeutic progress able to relieve suffering 
and save lives’ (ibid).  The author argues that embryonic stem cells pose acute problems.  
They can only be obtained from embryos aged approximately one week, at the blastula stage.  
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The embryo at the blastula stage is approximately nine days old.  At the centre of this cell 
mass there lies a cavity filled with liquid, and the few cells it contains – embryonic stem cells 
– are the ‘cause of all the excitement among biologists’ (ibid).  Research on embryos is 
extremely controversial irrespective of the stage of the embryo’s development.  As Cazillis 
(ibid) shows, a report by British stem cell experts, in this case from the UK Department of 
Health in 1990, stressed that a significant body of opinion believes that it is morally and 
ethically unacceptable to use an embryo for any form of research whatsoever.  This is for the 
reason that some feel the embryo should be recognised as having a full human status 
immediately it is conceived.  At the other end of the spectrum, the Department of Health 
researchers found that others claim that the embryo neither requires nor merits any kind of 
‘special status’.  Others, the report shows, accept the ‘special status’ of the embryo as a 
‘potential’ human being, but maintain that the respect due to the embryo increases as it 
develops and grows, and that this ‘respect’ has to be weighed against any potential benefits of 
research. 
As Cazillis (ibid) points out, some countries do finance research upon human 
embryos, others refuse to engage in it, and some ban the practice outright.  In the United 
Kingdom, where public financing accepts research along existing lines, but not the creation of 
new ones,  the private sector is subject to the rules laid down by each Member State (ibid).  
As the author suggests, in cases where such research is permitted, there is the question of 
where the embryos actually come from.  ‘Researchers who have developed existing stem cell 
lines (the exact number is not known, but it undoubtedly runs into dozens) have used surplus 
embryos’ (ibid).  These were created then conserved by the process of freezing with the 
intention to use them in in vitro fertilisation, but then they ceased to be part of a parental 
project either because the couple had parted company or the IVF was successful.  They were 
thus destined to be destroyed.  As Cazillis (ibid: 2) suggests, ‘It is not known how many 
embryos of this kind are available, and if a major research activity were to develop, there are 
some who inevitably envisage creating in vitro embryos specially for scientific purposes’ 
(ibid).  As Cazillis makes clear, this would pose great ethical implications and would be seen 
as ‘one more step in the direction of embryo reification’.  Cazillis does not appear to view 
embryos (which some view as ‘potential’ human beings) as social actors, hence the use of the 
phrase reification.    Strictly speaking, if an embryo is unable to formulate and act upon a 
decision, under the definition employed here it is clearly reification to regard the entity as an 
actor. 
Another controversial area of human biotechnology is the transfer of somatic nuclei, 
‘sometimes known as ‘therapeutic cloning’’ (Cazillis, ibid).  This involves transferring the 
nucleus of a ‘normal’ cell to a previously enucleated egg, with the aim of ‘creating’ an 
embryo carrying a patient’s genes in order to extract stem cells which are compatible with 
his/her immune system.  In this case too, Cazillis (ibid) points out that embryo reification may 
apply.  What is more, the door may be opened to, ‘reproductive cloning or, in other words, the 
universally condemned practice of creating an embryo carrying the genes of a single 
individual and then bringing it to its full development’ (Cazillis, ibid).  Present research is 
taking place within a very varied, changing legal framework.  As the author suggests, 
questions are being raised about the ‘ownership’ of cell lines and the tissues they are able to 
‘create’ and eventually transplant (the cell banks will soon be a social reality) and ‘on the 
patentability of the products and techniques which originate during such research’ (ibid: 3). 
Newman and Brody (1988] refer to an area of concern pertaining to the moral/ethical 
domain which is part of ‘the cultural context of doctor-patient relationships’.  It refers to, 
‘what both doctors and patients regard as good, proper, right, correct or desirable; it applies 
equally to the converse – what they regard as bad, improper, wrong, incorrect or undesirable’ 
(ibid).  Such perceptions are arguably determined by the overall cultural, including religious 
and legal, context of medical practice (ibid).  As the authors go on to suggest, ‘in most of the 
Western world they favour, at least as ideals, the principles of autonomy (or self-
determination)’, and ‘justice (as in equality of access to resources and competing claims to 
scarce resources), and beneficence in medical care (the value that the patient, the person in 
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need, not the family, the doctor or the state) comes first’ (ibid).  Newman and Brody (ibid: 2) 
are of the opinion that, ‘taken together they express the Kantian view of respect for persons’, 
in this case, the patient.  However, such ideals are inevitably compromised.  Thus, certain 
religious groups view the principle of patient autonomy with considerable alarm.  As 
Newman and Brody suggest, ‘in the past this was expressed mainly by limiting access to 
contraceptive technology on grounds that coitus was intended only to produce children, and 
that such technology would foster promiscuity’ (ibid).  Today, the pro-life movement express 
similar alarms, whilst working towards the prohibition of abortion and towards granting 
foetuses the status of persons, thus interfering with the clinical judgement of physicians, the 
experience of patients and research to improve both, in the view of Newman and Brody.  
Here, we can apply the metaconcept of reification again, as the reference to the ‘pro life’ 
desire to award special status to foetuses may be interpreted as embryo reification as was 
identified in the work of Cazillis (2001).  It seems difficult to regard a foetus as an actor in 
the sense employed in the framework, that is to say, an entity that is, in principle, capable of 
formulating and acting upon decisions.   
In what follows, we apply the meta-concept of essentialism to the study of genetics 
and identity and related literature which attempts to redefine the relationship between ‘the 
social’ and ‘nature’. Our task here, to recap, is to demonstrate the conceptual usefulness of the 
‘new’ modified framework. 
 
Essentialism 
Essentialism as employed in Sibeon’s (2004: 4) system refers to, ‘a form of theorising that in 
aprioristic fashion presupposes a unity or homogeneity of social phenomena, such as the law 
or some other social institution’ or taxonomic collectivities such as ‘women’ or ‘white 
people’ etc. The term essentialism is used here to refer to the illegitimate attribution of 
homogeneity to social phenomena on a priori grounds. This is distinct from ‘the uses of this 
term which are to do with the question of whether phenomena - social categories such as 
‘women’ for example – have real essences or are socially – constructed’ (ibid]. 
Sibeon (1996: 34) makes the point that although essentialism is clearly related to 
reductionism it has a tendency to be more specifically linked, ‘to the reductionist notion that 
taxonomic collectivities – such as “women” – are a relatively homogeneous category 
comprised of individuals (individual women, in this instance) who have more or less common 
(and “objective”) interests’ that are ‘given’ to them because of their structural position in the 
taxonomic collectivity’.  The author suggests that essentialism can be found in abundance in 
contemporary feminisms, for example (ibid).  As he goes on to show, essentialist feminist 
theories of which Elliott and Mandell’s (1995) work is cited as an example, mistakenly 
suppose that, ‘’women” as represented in the theory is a social category that is empirically 
“real”’, in other words a category given by biology/society rather than the ‘product’ of social 
construction or a feminist theoretical construct (ibid).  With these points in mind, it is 
therefore possible to identify the ‘cardinal sins’ of essentialism within certain feminist 
critiques of human biotechnology.  Hanmer (1993) refers to how the Western ‘birth control 
movement’ was influenced by Galtonian eugenic ideas and their political expression, in 
addition to how the movement may be perceived as a grass-roots movement to enable women 
to space their children in order to protect their health.  In doing so, she arguably engages  in 
essentialism and reification when she refers to ‘this double edge of control by women and of 
women by the state remains an unresolved issue today’ (ibid: 231).  Hanmer refers to women 
as if they are a homogeneous category whilst attributing agency to ‘the state’, which is an 
entity most definitely not an actor according to the definition employed by Sibeon, and in the 
‘new’ framework outlined here.  She also draws attention to a critique of human 
biotechnology common to feminisms, in which the notion of choice for women is challenged 
by ‘arguing that the pressures on women to have children, but only when it is socially 
acceptable to do so’ (ibid: 232) are so great that it is pointless to discuss issues of ‘choice’. 
Again, the emphasis is upon women as an essentialist monolithic block.  ‘Women are seen as 
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having no option about whether or not to have babies’, and ‘motherhood is socially 
compulsory, even in countries with coercive population control policies’ are phrases (ibid) 
which further indicate Hanmer’s essentialist tendencies. Hanmer identifies another ‘line of 
attack’ which criticises human reproductive technologies from feminist standpoints, for being, 
‘about something very different from what is claimed’, in other words, ‘not about helping 
women to have children, but rather being an aspect of genetic engineering closely associated 
with new developments in biotechnology’ (Kollek, 1990, Shiva, 1988).  This includes the 
attempt to map the entire human gene pool, beginning with the Human Genome Project, to 
‘improve’ human embryos through genetic testing and the addition/subtraction of genetic 
material (Kaufmann, 1998; and Leuzinger and Rambert 1998).  Again, the emphasis in 
Hanmer’s work is upon the implications for ‘women’ as a category which is, in an essentialist 
way, empirically “real” and homogeneous. Hanmer goes on to refer to feminist literature such 
as that of Bridenthal, Grossman and Kaplan (1984); Degener (1990); Ewing (1988); Kaupen-
Haus (1988); Schleiermacher (1990); and Zimmerman (1990), which suggests that 
‘modifying and eliminating people before birth gives a new twist to eugenics’ (ibid: 234).  
However, her claim that ‘it can also be seen to be about men as a class taking control of 
women’s reproductive activities’ is surely a case of essentialism.  Here, Hanmer appears to 
refer to both ‘women’ and ‘men’ in essentialist terms as homogenous social phenomena. 
In what follows, we apply the meta-concept of Genetic Fatalism to the study of 
genetics and identity, in order to demonstrate the explanatory potential of this ‘new’ term.  
Sibeon’s original anti-reductionist framework does not include this concept, which as Owen 
(2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2009, 2012), Owen and Powell [2006] and Powell and Owen 
(2005) define as the tendency within social science to associate genetic 
predisposition/determinism with inevitability.   
 
Genetic Fatalism 
We have examined evidence from the work of Ridley (1999, 2003) against this ‘cardinal sin’ 
of illegitimate theoretical reasoning, which suggests a great degree of plasticity and mutuality 
between genes and environment.  As Ridley notes, a favourite slogan of those involved in the 
counter-attack against the ideas of E.O. Wilson was, ‘Not in our genes!’  Perhaps at the time it 
was ‘a plausible hypothesis to assert that genetic influences on behaviour were slight or non-
existent’ (Ridley, ibid).  However, the work of Rose, Kamin and Lewontin (1984) may be ‘no 
longer tenable’ in the light of studies in behavioural genetics which offer cogent evidence 
that, ‘genes do influence behaviour’ (Ridley, ibid).  It will be recalled that the work of Owen 
[2009] examines the convincing evidence from authors in the fields of Evolutionary 
Psychology and Behavioural Sciences, such as Hamer and Copeland (1999), Enard et al 
(2002), Lai (2001), Dunbar (1996), Pinker (1994), Harris (1998), Bogaert and Fisher (1995), 
Curry (2003) and Cosmides and Tooby (1997) amongst others for an, at least in part, genetic 
basis for human behaviour. 
It is to the concept of the oversocialised gaze that we must now turn our attention.  
Again, we examine the explanatory potential of the meta-concept in relation to the study of 
human identity and genetics. 
 
The Oversocialised Gaze 
The Oversocialised Gaze refers to accounts which are harshly environmentalist and 
antipathetic towards genetic or partially genetic explanations of human behaviour.  The 
accounts may even reject genetic variables altogether, as Giddens (1993: 57) appears to do 
when suggesting that, ‘human beings have no instincts in the sense of complex patterns of 
unlearned behaviour’. There is cogent evidence for instinctive, unlearned patterns of human 
behaviour in the work of authors such as Ridley (1999, 2003), Hamer and Copeland (1999), 
Pinker (1994) and Dunbar (1996) especially regarding the idea that, ‘grammar is innate’ 
(Ridley, 1999: 104). 
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There is a tendency of writers of the ‘embodied school’ or ‘sociologists of the body’ 
to engage in oversocialised approaches. Tim Newton’s (2003: 29) criticisms of Sahlins’ 
(1972) and Pollock’s (1988) approaches (in the area of ‘building bridges’ between the social 
and life sciences) centre around the latter authors’ respective portrayals of stress as the 
product of ‘natural’ instincts.  In Newton’s view, ‘such arguments present a crude dualism’ 
which reduces complex social ‘problems’ to ‘outmoded’ conceptions of ‘the biological body’ 
(ibid).  He then goes on to argue for a ‘putative non-reductionistic ‘biological sociology’’. It 
is difficult to envisage a credible ‘biological sociology’ in the age of the Human Genome 
Project which denies human instincts altogether.  It is not appropriate here to rehearse all the 
evidence provided in the work of Owen [2009] for the instinctive component of human 
language ability, sexuality etc.  However, it could be argued that Newton (ibid) appears to be 
unaware of the fairly recent evidence provided by Ridley (1999) for an account of stress in 
human beings which posits the ‘nature via nurture’ approach to causality.  Newton’s arguably 
oversocialised concept of stress emphasises the influence of complex social factors whilst 
rejecting any reference to ‘natural’ instinctive, genetically-based behaviour.  Ridley (ibid) 
arguably shows how it is indeed possible to include both genetic and environment variables in 
an explanation of stress in human beings. 
As Ridley (ibid: 149) acknowledges, stress in human beings is ‘caused’ by ‘the 
outside world’, and ‘short-term stressors cause an immediate increase in epinephrine and 
norepinephrine’, which are the hormones that make the human heart beat faster, the feet go 
cold etc.  These hormones act to prepare the human body for ‘fight or flight’ in emergencies.  
Stressors that last for longer activate a different pathway that results in a much slower, but 
more persistent increase in cortisol.  Cortisol is ‘used in virtually every system in the body’ 
and is a ‘hormone that literally integrates the body and the mind’ by altering the configuration 
of the brain’ (ibid).  As the author suggests, ‘one of cortisol’s most surprising effects is that it 
suppresses the working of the immune system’, and those who have shown the symptoms of 
stress are ‘more likely to catch colds and other infections’, because one of the effects 
produced by cortisol is the reduction of white blood cells (ibid: 149-150).  Ridley goes on to 
show how the relationship between genes and environment is one of mutuality rather than an 
oversocialised conception which rejects genes and instinct in favour of a solely social 
explanation of the kind suggested by Newton (2003) in his treatment of the work of Sahlin 
(1972) and Pollack (1988).  Ridley (ibid: 150) explains how the hormone cortisol reduces the 
‘activity, number and lifetime of lymphocytes’, or white blood cells, showing how cortisol 
does this by switching genes on. 
As Ridley suggests, ‘you cannot produce, regulate and respond to cortisol without 
hundreds of genes’, practically all of which ‘work’ by ‘switching each other on and off’. In 
white blood cells, ‘control is almost certainly involved’ in ‘switching on’ the gene known as 
TCF, on chromosome ten, which enables TCF to make its own protein, ‘whose job is to 
suppress the expression of another protein called interleukin 2’ which in turn, is a ‘chemical 
that puts white blood cells on alert to be especially vigilant for germs’ (ibid).  Thus, cortisol 
suppresses the ‘immune alertness of white blood’ and renders the person, ‘more susceptible to 
disease’ (ibid).  The author goes on to pose an interesting question: ‘Who’s in charge?  Who 
ordered all these switches to be set in the right way in the first place, and who decides when to 
start to let loose the cortisol?’ (ibid).  The answer does not lie with the genes solely, even 
though ‘the differentiation of the body into different cell types, each with different genes 
switched on’ is a genetic process ‘at root’ (ibid).  Genes are not the ‘cause’ of stress, and as 
Ridley makes clear, ‘the death of a loved one, or an impending exam, do not speak directly to 
the genes’ (ibid).  They are, in essence, ‘information’ processed by the human brain.  Is the 
human brain ‘in charge’?  On one hand, as the author suggests, the hypothalamus of the 
human brain, ‘sends out the signal that tells the pituitary gland to release a hormone that tells 
the adrenal gland to make and secrete cortisol’ (ibid: 151).  The hypothalamus takes ‘orders’ 
from ‘the conscious part of the brain which gets its information from the outside world’ (ibid).  
However, as Ridley suggests, this ‘answer’ will not suffice ‘because the brain is part of the 
body’.   
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In answer to what did ‘set up the system’, Ridley suggests that ‘natural selection did’, 
and ‘somewhere down the cascade of events that is the production, control and reaction to 
cortisol’ stress-prone people ‘must have subtly different genes from phlegmatic folk’ (ibid).  
Who or what is ultimately ‘in charge’?  Ridley’s answer is that ‘nobody is in charge’, rather 
an ‘intricate, cleverly designed and interconnected system’ in which nurture depends upon 
genes, and genes require nurture in an elegant mutuality.  This is, arguably, far removed from 
the oversocialised explanation for stress posited by Newton (2003), or that which the author 
identifies as ‘crude dualism’ in the work of Sahlin (1972) and Pollack (1988). 
 Owen (2006a) has identified the work of Gagnon and Simon (1973) and  Foucault 
(1980) as examples of accounts which rely upon the oversocialised gaze.  As Owen 
(2006a:190) suggests, ‘Foucault’s (1980b) argument that sexuality is a socio-cultural creation, 
that sexuality as we know it is the production of a particular set of historical circumstances 
and obtained only within the terms of a discourse’ is oversocialised.  Owen refers to the work 
of Hamer and Copeland (1999: 163), which shows how genes influence our sexual desire, 
how often we have sex  and, ‘help make us receptive to the social interactions and signs of 
mutual attraction that we feel instinctively’.  In the case of Foucault’s (1980b) work, his belief 
that sexuality is ‘controlled’ through definition and regulation (rather than by the ‘impression’ 
suggested by Rich’s (1981) feminist analysis of heterosexuality), in particular via the creation 
of sexual categories such as heterosexuality and so on is open to question.  In the case of 
female sexuality, Foucault (ibid) argues that it is ‘controlled’ not by the denial or ‘silencing’ 
favoured in Walby’s (1990) feminist account, but by constant referral.  Foucault suggests that 
the history of sexuality is in effect a history of shifting forms of control/regulation.  In the 
case of the last hundred years or so, the shift has been away from the church’s moral 
regulation towards an increased regulation through education, medicine, psychology, law, 
social work, social policy etc.  ‘Sex’, for Foucault (ibid) is not a biological ‘entity’ but rather 
an idea, a concept which is always specific to certain cultures and cultural and historical 
periods.  Sexuality for Foucault is produced through discourses on sexuality, which shape 
human sexual values and beliefs.  This, as Owen (2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2009, 2012 ) 
suggests, appears to be an oversocialised perspective which denies the notion of a biological 
sexual drive altogether.  As Ridley (1999: 149) shows, ‘a gene on chromosome 10 called 
CYP17’ directly affects sexuality in human beings.   The gene manufacturers an enzyme 
which enables the human body to convert cholesterol into cortisol, testosterone and oestradiol, 
and without the enzyme, the pathway is blocked and the only hormones that can be made 
from cholesterol are progesterone and corticosterone. People lacking a ‘working copy’ of this 
gene ‘cannot make other sex hormones so they fail to go through puberty; if genetically male, 
they look like girls’ (ibid). 
Owen (2006a) has identified Gagnon and Simon’s (1973) symbolic interactionism as 
oversocialised. Gagnon and Simon suggest a radical form of social constructivism in which 
there is no sexual drive in the ‘natural’ sense that it is said all human beings possess to 
varying extents as part of biological make-up.  They argue for a model of human sexual drive 
purely as social construction.  Not only do we learn what ‘sex’ means, and who/what is 
sexually arousing to us, but we also learn to want sex.  Though Gagnon and Simon 
acknowledge that the body has a repertoire of biological ‘gratifications’ (ie, the capacity for 
orgasm), it does not automatically follow that we would want to engage with them. Certain 
‘gratifications’ will be selected as ‘sexual’ via the learning of ‘sexual scripts’.  For example, a 
particular experience would not be repeatedly sought after unless there was the presence of a 
‘meaningful’ script.  From Gagnon and Simon’s oversocialised perspective, which denies a 
biological component to sexual drive (different from the ‘gratifications’) socialisation is not 
about learning to control innate sexual desires in order that they are expressed in socially 
acceptable ways, but rather the learning of ‘sexual scripts’ of some complexity which serve to 
specify circumstances which will elicit sexual desire and ‘make’ the person wish to engage in 
certain acts with his/her body.  Thus, for the authors, sexual drive is, as it is for Foucault 
(1980b), a ‘learnt social goal’.  Having examined the explanatory potential of the 
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oversocialised gaze as a meta-concept of the ‘new’ framework, we must next look at the 
concept of the biological variable. 
 
The Biological Variable 
The biological variable is referred to as a ‘new’ term.  The term, or meta-concept, is ‘new’ in 
the sense that it is not employed by Sibeon.  We should regard the meta-concept as referring 
to the evidence for an, at least, in part biological basis for some human behavior.  Its use 
arises out of a respectful critique of Sibeon’s original anti-reductionism on the grounds that it 
neglects biological or part biological causality in explication of social ‘reality’ (Owen, 2006a, 
2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2009, 2012 ; Owen and Powell [2006]; and Powell and Owen, 2005).   
It is the contention here that theoretical analysis, particularly that pertaining to the 
study of genetics and identity and related areas in which links are attempted between ‘the 
social’ and biology (Benton, 1991, 1994; Williams, 1998, 2003; Bury, 1997; Newton, 2003), 
it is essential to recognise that, ‘genes do influence behaviour’ (Ridley, 199: 306) and that the 
harshly ‘environmentalist’ accounts of Foucault (1980b) and Gagnon and Simon (1973) in 
which sexuality, for example, is completely learned behaviour are no longer plausible 
hypotheses in the age of the Human Genome Project.  Wilkie’s (1994: 171-72) treatment of 
the ‘moral consequences of molecular biology’ contains the expression of unease at the 
possibility that the Project will ‘point up differences between individual humans at a genetic 
level’.  The author suggests that if such genetic knowledge is ‘not handled properly and seen 
in its proper, biological context’, it may lead to the generation of information which enables 
‘new grounds of discrimination’.  From the point of view of ‘the Project’s very existence’, we 
may take an increasingly ‘’atomistic’ view of human beings and indeed of life itself’ (ibid).  
Wilkie’s (ibid) greatest fear is that the advances in human biotechnology may lead to a 
tendency to ‘define ourselves in genetic terms and neglect the rest’.  The author draws 
attention to the possibility of the risk that, ‘we may all become reductionists reducing our 
lives to their supposedly fundamental components’, missing the holistic ‘complexity and 
richness of life in its entirety’.  Arguably, Wilkie’s fears are misplaced.  There is no reason to 
suppose that such ‘geneticization’ (also referred to by Opitz, 2000 ] should ever come about. 
The ‘biological variable’ should be recognised as playing a part in causality, but equally there 
is a role for the environment (part of the ‘complexity’ and ‘richness’ referred to by Wilkie) 
which is ‘massively important’ (Ridley, ibid) in the sense that genes are ‘switched on’ by 
social cues.  Acknowledging a genetic component to causality does not have to entail the 
genetic fatalism engaged in by Wilkie.  The three authors of Not in our Genes; Steven Rose, 
Leon Kamin and Richard Lewontin made the point that ‘biological determinists’ believe the 
credo “you can’t change human nature” to be the beginning and end of the human condition.  
However, as Ridley (1999: 307) makes clear, ‘this equation-determinism equals fatalism – is 
so well understood to be a fallacy that it is hard to find the straw men that the three critics 
indict’. 
The evidence for biological variables playing a part in human behavior, such as 
reactions to stress, language and sexuality has been explored in some considerable depth by 
Owen [2009] and the source of the insights (largely evolutionary psychological) has been 
examined with reference to the staunch defence of such ideas by Curry (2003); Dawkins [ 
1986);  Daly and Wilson (1998); Tooby and De Vore (1987); Cosmides and Tooby (1997), 
Ridley (1999, 2003) etc, and criticisms by those such as Rose and Rose (2000); David (2002); 
Rose (2000); Rose et al (1984).   
 
Conclusion 
The Genetic-Social framework outlined and selectively demonstrated here is arguably best 
equipped to point a possible way forward towards a new sociology of genetics and identity 
that entails a reliance upon multifactorial analysis, and an avoidance of reified and 
essentialist analysis and the anti-foundational relativism of the cultural turn. Additonally, the 
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sensitizing device sidesteps the nature-nurture divide, emphasising instead, ‘a balanced 
account of the mutuality between genes and environment’ [Owen, 2012: 94]. These elements 
combined hopefully make the framework a useful conceptual toolkit which incorporates a 
realist social ontology with a rejection of bio-phobia. 
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